From the perspective of self-interest, can we show that it is reasonable to conform to the expectations of morality? Does it pay to be moral? Doesn’t morality demand that I suppress my own inclinations and desires for the benefit of others and how can that be reasonable? Unless I am better off being moral than I would be otherwise, no reasons could motivate me to conform to the expectations of morality. Yet moral thinking seems to require an impartial perspective, where our motivating reasons are not driven by or biased by self-interest, as the interests of all should be equally considered.
Students will be introduced to three contrasting approaches which try to make sense of the relation between self-interest, practical reason and morality. The chosen topics will not only introduce candidates to issues developed in A2 moral philosophy and political philosophy, but also relate to issues addressed in the texts: in particular , Plato's Republic, Mill's On Liberty and Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil.
Students will be introduced to three contrasting approaches which try to make sense of the relation between self-interest, practical reason and morality. The chosen topics will not only introduce candidates to issues developed in A2 moral philosophy and political philosophy, but also relate to issues addressed in the texts: in particular , Plato's Republic, Mill's On Liberty and Nietzsche's Beyond Good and Evil.
The issues to be covered are:
Morality as a social contract
- It is reasonable to conform to the expectations of morality because morality is a conventional agreement for our mutual advantage?
- Exactly what kind of agreement could it be?
- Can we articulate our self-interest independently of morality?
Morality as constitutive of self-interest
- It is reasonable to conform to the expectations of morality because self-interest can only be realised in the context of a moral life?
- Are self-interested reasons compatible with an understanding of morality?
Morality as overcoming self-interest
- Is it reasonable to conform to the expectations of morality and these expectations disregard self-interest as morally relevant.
- Does eschewing self-interest leave us without any motivating reasons to act altruistically?
- Is moral motivation a reflection of natural dispositions (eg Humean ‘sympathy’) and, if so, what might be the implications for ethics?
